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Federalism and the Rise of 
Renewable Energy: Preserving 
State and Local Voices in the 
Green Energy Revolution 
Daniel A. Lyons† 
The rise of renewable energy has disrupted the traditional 
regulatory structure governing electricity. Unlike traditional fossil fuel 
power plants, wind and solar facilities are geographically constrained: 
they exist where the wind blows and the sun shines. Large-scale 
renewable energy is more likely to flow interstate, from resource-rich 
prairie and Southwestern states to energy-hungry population centers 
elsewhere. The difficulties of coordinating interstate electricity policies 
have led some to call for greater preemption of the states’ traditional 
duties as chief regulators of the electricity industry. But while 
preemption would eliminate some state-level roadblocks to interstate 
cooperation, it would sacrifice many of the benefits of local knowledge 
and experimentation in a diverse and innovative new marketplace. 
This paper examines the benefits of a cooperative federalism 
approach to electricity regulation. The challenges facing renewable 
energy are regional in scope, and there is value in preserving state and 
local voices in policymaking decisions. It examines three aspects of the 
renewable energy debate—siting generation facilities, building 
transmission lines, and adopting demand-side renewable energy 
standards—and, for each, explores governance structures that would 
promote greater regional cooperation without sacrificing the benefits 
of decentralized government. 
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Introduction 
America is in the midst of a quiet electricity revolution. Spurred 
by federal policies promoting energy diversity1 and state initiatives to 
decrease reliance on fossil fuels,2 companies have begun investing 
significantly in renewable electricity generation. From 2000 to 2012, 
wind power capacity in the United States increased twenty-five fold 
to over 60,000 megawatts,3 enough to power more than fourteen 
million homes.4 Solar electricity capacity has quadrupled in the past 
four years alone, reaching the 10,000 megawatt milestone in 2013.5 
America currently generates approximately thirteen percent of its 
total electricity from renewable sources,6 and the Department of  
1. See, e.g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
617, 92 Stat. 3119 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012)) (requiring 
utilities to interconnect with non-utility-owned electricity generation 
facilities); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 
2776 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 (2012)) (establishing renewable 
energy production tax credit and incentive payments for new renewable 
electricity sold on the wholesale market). 
2. As discussed in greater depth below, thirty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia have adopted some form of a renewable portfolio standard 
(RPS), which requires utilities to purchase a certain percentage of their 
electricity from renewable sources or to offset a portion of their fossil-
fuel-based electricity through renewable energy credits (REC). See infra 
Part I.C. The Department of Energy tracks state renewable portfolio 
requirements. See Rules, Regulations, & Policies for Renewable Energy, 
Database for State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 
2014) (providing “a snapshot of government and utility rules, 
regulations and policies that promote renewables in the United States”). 
3. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Installed Wind Capacity, Energy.gov, 
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (noting that installed wind capacity was 
2,472 megawatts as of December 31, 1999, and 60,005 megawatts as of 
December 31, 2012). 
4. See Jason P. Brown, The Cycles of Wind Power Development, Main 
Street Economist, no. 3, 2013, at 1, 1, available at http://www. 
kansascityfed.org/publicat/mse/MSE_0313.pdf (“By the end of 2012, 
estimated total capacity was about 60,000 MW, enough to power 
between 14 million and 24 million homes annually.”). 
5. US Reaches Milestone of 10 Gigawatt Solar Photovoltaic Capacity, 
Solarbuzz (July 9, 2013), http://www.solarbuzz.com/news/recent-
findings/us-reaches-milestone-10-gigawatt-solar-photovoltaic-capacity-
according-npd-sola (“Solar PV installations in the US have seen 
significant growth since the start of 2010; 83% of the 10 GW were 
completed within the past 14 quarters.”).  
6. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electric Power Monthly with 
Data for November 2013 12 (2014), [hereinafter Data for 
November 2013] (showing summary statistics for net electricity 
generation from January through October 2013, which exhibit 
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Energy expects that share to grow.7 It estimates that one-third of all 
new capacity built in the next quarter-century will be from renewable 
sources.8  
Renewable energy differs from more traditional electricity sources 
in several important ways. Perhaps most obviously, renewable energy 
generates less carbon dioxide and air pollutants than traditional coal 
or natural gas-fired power plants, which makes it an attractive 
alternative for environmentalists.9 And fuel costs are negligible: while 
traditional electricity often depends on fossil fuels whose prices vary 
in the market, wind and sunshine are free. But those fuel sources are 
intermittent. Renewable facilities produce energy only when the wind 
 
“hydroelectric conventional” and “renewable sources excluding 
hydroelectric” totals that make up 12.94% of the United States’ total 
electricity generation). 
7. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2013 6 
(2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013). 
pdf. The report models six potential cases for a renewable share of the 
2040 generation market, which range from a low of fourteen percent to a 
high of thirty-one percent. The base case projection of sixteen percent 
assumes that generation will grow as technology matures and costs 
decline, which make them more economical in later years of generation. 
Falling natural gas prices can negatively impact renewable generation, 
as it will lead companies to substitute natural gas-fired generation 
instead (driving the fourteen percent scenario). Id. at 5. Alternatively, a 
carbon tax will likely increase the share of generation from renewable 
sources, as it will raise the cost of fossil fuel generation (leading to 
estimates between twenty-three and thirty-one percent share for 
renewable energy, depending on the magnitude of the carbon tax). Id. 
Note that these figures include hydroelectric power as a renewable 
resource. 
8. Id. at 72. Interestingly, although hydroelectric power comprises a 
significant portion of today’s renewable energy, capacity growth in this 
sector is expected to be negligible. Almost all new renewable 
construction is expected to be solar, wind, and, to a lesser extent, 
biomass or geothermal energy. Id. at 74. As discussed in greater depth 
in Part II, the discrepancy between significant growth in renewable 
capacity and lesser growth in renewable share of total electricity 
generation stems from the fact that renewable resources typically have a 
lower capacity factor than traditional energy sources. Wind and solar 
power operate intermittently, so they do not generate maximum 
electricity for as long a period of time as traditional coal or gas-fired 
generators. See, e.g., Bob Bellemare, What is a Megawatt?, 
Commodities Now (Mar. 2010), http://www.commodities-now.com/ 
reports/power-and-energy/2136-what-is-a-megawatt.html. (noting that 
coal plants operate at a capacity of sixty percent or higher while wind 
sites and solar generators operate at a capacity of forty percent or less). 
9. See David B. Spence, Regulation, Climate Change, and the Electric 
Grid, 3 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 267, 270 (2012) (noting 
that the decrease in GHG emissions associated with wind and solar 
energy sources “may represent an environmental improvement”). 
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blows or the sun shines, which poses challenges for grid regulators. 
And significantly, renewable electricity must be generated where its 
fuel is found. Unlike fossil fuel or nuclear power plants, which can be 
located virtually anywhere in the country, wind turbines can only be 
built in windy locations and large-scale solar projects are most feasible 
in hot, arid environments. Renewable energy thus requires significant 
infrastructure investment to bring electricity from generators  
to consumers. 
Though renewable energy will not displace fossil fuels as 
American’s primary electricity source anytime soon, its growth 
threatens the stability of the traditional regulatory model governing 
electricity. Like many New Deal–era administrative statutes, the 
Federal Power Act divided regulatory authority neatly between the 
federal government, which regulates interstate electricity sales, and 
state regulators, which regulate intrastate activity.10 Historically this 
division favored state regulators, as electricity was primarily an 
intrastate industry: vertically integrated utilities built power plants 
near population centers then constructed transmission lines to carry 
electricity to the local community and distribution networks to deliver 
power to consumers.11 Most utilities operated within a state-granted 
intrastate service area and were overseen primarily by state public 
utility commissions.12 
But the deregulation of electricity generation, and the rise of 
renewable energy in particular, have threatened the states’ primacy. 
Improvements in transmission technology and federal policies 
promoting independent (non-utility-owned) power production have 
created a competitive wholesale power market allowing for more 
interstate electricity sales.13 In the renewable power sector, a 
significant portion of electricity is likely to flow interstate. Renewable 
energy potential is highest in the Midwest and southwestern states, 
where wind and sunshine are abundant. But it is likely to be 
consumed by load centers several hundred miles away.14 The existing 
 
10. See Ari Peskoe, Note, A Challenge for Federalism: Achieving National 
Goals in the Electricity Industry, 18 Mo. Envtl. L & Pol’y Rev. 209, 
220–21 (2011) (discussing the addition of federal regulatory authority 
meant to supplement present state regulation). 
11. See id. at 217 (noting that early on “the electricity industry was 
vertically integrated with a single company producing, transmitting and 
distributing electricity to end users”).  
12. See id. at 212–16 (discussing regulation in the early 20th century by 
state public utility commissions); Richard J. Pierce Jr. & Ernest 
Gellhorn, Regulated Industries in a Nutshell 364 (4th ed. 1999). 
13. See infra Part I.B.  
14. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality—Finding 
Ways to Site Wind Power Facilities, 32 Wm. & Mary Evntl. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 635, 666 (2008) (explaining that successful wind sites are 
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transmission network is insufficient to transport large quantities of 
renewable electricity to load centers, or to manage the variability 
created by intermittent renewable generation. And many states eager 
to promote “clean energy” will lack the ability to do so without 
cooperation from neighbors whose geography is more amenable to 
renewable generation.  
With some states poised to become net exporters of renewable 
energy, and others net importers, some policymakers have questioned 
whether states should continue to serve as chief regulators of the 
electricity industry. Since 1978, Congress and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken numerous steps to 
increase federal regulation of the electricity market, some of which 
have proven more successful than others. Citing the interstate nature 
of renewable energy markets, the national benefits of reduced fossil 
fuel consumption, and state and local barriers that inhibit renewables 
growth, more voices are calling for the federal government to displace 
the states and assume the primary role over the electricity industry. 
But these calls for federal preemption overlook the ongoing 
interests of state and local governments in shaping the renewable 
energy sector. Many key policy questions facing the renewable power 
sector—where to build new renewable generation facilities, how to 
modify and extend the transmission network, and how to calibrate the 
appropriate fuel mix between renewable power and more traditional 
electricity sources—are regional in scope. While there is 
unquestionably a federal interest in preventing parochial state 
interests from jeopardizing broader regional benefits, there is a 
concomitant state interest in leveraging local knowledge and 
identifying instances where regional diversity makes a uniform federal 
policy inappropriate or inefficient. Especially in an industry as 
dynamic as electricity generation, it is important to preserve space for 
experimentation and innovation that could be crowded out by broad 
federal mandates. 
This paper explores the ongoing role that state and local officials 
should play in the renewable energy sector. The dual federalism 
approach embodied by the Federal Power Act offers a false dichotomy 
between state and federal regulation. Cooperative federalism provides 
the potential for greater dialogue between state and local officials, and 
allows for more regional experimentation within broad federal 
confines. Cooperative federalism has been instrumental in helping 
policymakers manage transitions in many other regulated industries, 
and those insights can help inform regulation of the increasingly 
dynamic and complex electricity industry. While a complete overview 
of the electricity industry is beyond the scope of this article, the 
 
typically located in remote places such as the Upper Midwest and often 
“great distances from the closest population source”). 
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discussion focuses on three key policy issues implicated by renewable 
energy: siting renewable generation facilities, managing and expanding 
the transmission grid, and determining appropriate renewables 
demand. For each issue, the article applies federalism principles to 
identify the key interests involved and explores structures that would 
promote regional cooperation where necessary without sacrificing the 
benefits of decentralized government. 
I. Electricity Regulation and the Rise 
of Renewable Generation 
A. The Traditional Regulated Utility Model 
Analysts typically separate the American electricity industry into 
four segments: fuel, power generation, transmission, and distribution.15 
Within the generation segment, most of America’s power plants run 
on fossil fuels. Two-thirds of all electricity generated in the United 
States in 2012 came from either coal or natural gas–fired power 
plants.16 Nuclear power accounted for another nineteen percent, while 
renewable energy made up twelve percent of America’s electricity in 
2012 and has gained share slightly in 2013.17 Once the electricity is 
generated, it travels over high-voltage transmission lines to a utility 
substation, where transformers convert the power to low-voltage 
electricity and distribution lines deliver it to customers.18 
Traditionally, state public utility commissions have regulated the 
vast majority of this industry. As Richard Pierce and Ernest Gellhorn 
explain, “[u]ntil 1978, virtually all electricity service was provided on 
a fully bundled basis by one of hundreds of integrated firms. The 
 
15. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate 
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism 
Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801, 1805 (2012). 
16. See Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, U.S. Energy 
Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page= 
electricity_in_the_united_states#tab2 (last updated Apr. 10, 2013) 
(noting thirty-seven percent of total electricity generation from coal, and 
thirty percent from natural gas). 
17. Id. Hydroelectric power comprised seven percent of total electricity 
generation in 2012, with five percent from other renewable resources 
including wind, solar, and biomass energy. Id. Additional installation of 
wind and solar energy in 2013 accounts for the year-over-year growth in 
the renewables sector. See Data for November 2013, supra note 6, at 
tbl.1.1.  
18. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1805–06. Transmission lines include 
lines carrying power at 115 kilovolts and above. By comparison, 
standard distribution lines deliver energy at 34.5 kilovolts or less. 
Regulatory Assistance Project, Electricity Regulation in the 
US: A Guide 65 (2011), available at http://www.raponline.org/ 
document/download/id/645. 
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integrated utility generated its own electricity, transmitted that 
electricity across its high voltage lines, and distributed the electricity 
to all customers in its service territory.”19  
 Typically, a utility received a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity from state regulators, which granted it the exclusive legal 
right to provide electric service within a territory. State regulators 
oversaw most aspects of the utility’s operations, including facilities 
construction, rate regulation, and customer service. 
The vertical integration of intrastate utility operations was not an 
accident; rather, it was a deliberate choice by policymakers to tame 
what economists considered a natural monopoly industry. Like other 
infrastructure industries, electricity providers must incur substantial 
fixed (and sunk) costs to bring electricity into a service area. But once 
the infrastructure is in place, the marginal cost of extending service to 
any given customer is trivial. This means that the average cost per 
customer falls with each additional customer added to the utility’s 
grid. As a result, regulators quickly determined that customers were 
better served by a single utility that built one grid and spread the 
costs across the entire population, rather than multiple utilities that 
built unnecessarily duplicative infrastructures at higher per-customer 
costs.20 In 1907, Wisconsin passed the first state public utility law,21 
which represented a grand bargain between the utility and the state.22 
In Wisconsin and states that followed, each investor-owned utility 
was chartered as the exclusive provider of electricity within a given 
service area, which insulated the utility from potentially destructive 
competition and reduced the financial risk of building electricity 
infrastructure. In exchange, utilities were obligated to provide reliable 
service throughout the service area on nondiscriminatory terms and 
were subject to rate regulation that guaranteed a reasonable rate of 
return without abusing their monopoly status.23 By 1920, almost every 
 
19. Pierce & Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 364. 
20. Very early in the history of the electricity industry, some cities 
encouraged competition among electricity providers. See, e.g., Peskoe, 
supra note 10, at 212–13 (discussing early efforts to promote electricity 
competition in Chicago). But these experiments typically ended in 
consolidation, which left customers effectively with one choice for 
electricity while wasting substantial capital on duplicative infrastructure 
that proved ultimately to be unnecessary. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The 
Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. & 
Econ. 269, 274 (1978). 
21. Peskoe, supra note 10, at 212. 
22. Electricity regulation began at the municipal level, but municipal 
franchises were widely seen as corrupt, and even honest city regulators 
were no match for a well-organized utility. See id. at 213. 
23. See id. at 213–14 (noting that rates were to be based on a fair valuation 
of property); Spence, supra note 9, at 274–75 (noting that in return for 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy 
1627 
state had a similar law governing the electricity industry. And when 
utilities threatened to outgrow their state regulators, the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 193524 limited the corporate structure 
of public utilities in a fashion that effectively confined most utilities 
to a single state.25  
The federal government played a much smaller role in electricity 
regulation. The Federal Water Power Act of 192026 created a Federal 
Power Commission, which built and operated hydroelectric dams on 
navigable waters, a traditionally federal resource.27 After the Supreme 
Court ruled that states could not regulate electricity sales across state 
lines,28 Congress in 1935 passed the Federal Power Act,29 which gave 
the Federal Power Commission authority over interstate electricity 
transmission and interstate wholesale power sales.30 The language of 
the Federal Power Act seemed broad, granting the Commission wide-
ranging authority to enforce “just and reasonable rates” on interstate 
power and to remedy “unduly discriminatory or preferential” 
practices.31 But Congress explained that the statute was meant merely 
to fill the gap exposed by the Court’s decision. The Act explicitly 
stated that the Commission’s authority would “extend only to those 
matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”32 
 
their status as a monopoly, utilities “were obligated to provide reliable 
service on a nondiscriminatory basis”). 
24. Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79 (2000)) (repealed 2005). 
25. Peskoe, supra note 10, at 218–19. 
26. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 791 (2012)). 
27. § 4(d), 41 Stat. at 1065. 
28. Rhode Island Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 
U.S. 83, 90 (1927). The case involved an agreement in which a Rhode 
Island electric utility agreed to sell a small portion of its electricity to a 
Massachusetts electricity utility for resale to customers in that state. Id. 
at 84. The Rhode Island utility later sought to increase the rate under 
the contract due to increasing generation costs. Id. at 85. The Rhode 
Island Public Utility Commission approved the rate increase, but the 
Massachusetts utility successfully argued in court that the Commission’s 
order was an unconstitutional direct burden on interstate commerce. Id. 
at 90. 
29. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 847 (1935) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824 (2012)). 
30. § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 847–48. 
31. §§ 205–06, 49 Stat. at 851–52. 
32. § 201(a), 49 Stat. at 847. This savings clause was typical in  
New Deal–era statutes that allocated authority between the federal 
government and the states. For example, the Communications Act of 
1934 explicitly provided that “nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
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The Federal Power Act thus created a clear division of authority 
over electricity issues between the federal government and the states. 
The Federal Power Commission oversaw interstate electricity sales.33 
But because federal securities laws largely prohibited electricity 
utilities from serving end-user customers in more than one state, the 
Commission’s responsibility was generally limited to the occasional 
interstate sale of surplus power between utilities. The state public 
utility commissions served as the primary guardians of the public 
interest. In the words of one commentator, state public utility 
commissions served as the “primary administrators of the ‘regulatory 
compact’ between utilities, customers, and investors.”34  
B. Federal Deregulation of the Generation Market and  
the Birth of Renewable Energy 
The decline of the traditional regulatory model, and the rise of 
renewable energy, both have their origins in the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,35 commonly known as “PURPA.” 
Passed as a reaction to the 1970s energy crisis, PURPA sought to 
diversify America’s electric power industry and improve reliability by 
encouraging non-utility companies to generate their own electricity for 
consumption and sale.36 PURPA provided special rights for small  
to apply or to give the [Federal Communications] Commission 
jurisdiction with respect to . . . charges, classifications, practices, 
services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate 
communication service.” Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1065 (codified at 
47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2012)). States lobbied to include these savings 
provisions to avoid federal agencies from using their power over 
interstate activity to reach intrastate activities that had an effect on 
interstate commerce, as the Interstate Commerce Commission had 
successfully done in the Shreveport Rate Case. See Houston, E. & W. 
Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (holding that 
the federal government could exert power over intrastate carriers); 
Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should 
Control the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. Mich. 
J.L. Reform 383, 386–90 (2010) (discussing state attempts to limit the 
scope of intrastate federal regulation). 
33. The New Deal established several federal agencies that boosted federal 
electricity generation, such as the Rural Electrification Administration 
and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Peskoe, supra note 10, at 222. By 
1950, the federal government generated twelve percent of all electricity 
in the United States. In addition, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave 
the Atomic Energy Commission authority to license nuclear power 
plants, in conjunction with state officials. And the Clean Air Act 
permitted the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate air 
pollution from power plants. Id.  
34. Id. at 222. 
35. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012)). 
36. §§ 2, 210, 92 Stat. at 3119, 3144. 
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power production facilities that generated electricity from renewable 
resources and cogeneration facilities that produced electricity in 
tandem with another form of thermal energy. Dubbed “qualifying 
facilities,” these entities had the right under PURPA to sell their 
surplus electricity at preferential rates to their electrical utilities.37 
PURPA also gave the Commission, now renamed the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, authority to order an electrical utility to 
connect qualifying facilities to the utility’s transmission system, so the 
facility could sell its surplus electricity elsewhere.38  
PURPA was a prominent part of a larger movement in the 1970s 
to stimulate competition in markets traditionally considered natural 
monopolies. Within the electricity sector, PURPA built upon the 
Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States,39 which upheld an antitrust claim against a utility that refused 
to allow an independent electricity producer use of its transmission 
lines to sell electricity to a customer within the utility’s service area.40 
Otter Tail suggested that antitrust law may prohibit state-granted 
monopolies from wielding market power in ways that inhibit the 
development of competition. In the telecommunications industry, 
which similarly consisted of state-granted local monopolies that 
provided telephone service at just and reasonable rates, independent 
upstarts like MCI and Sprint sued the Bell telephone monopoly, 
alleging that Bell used its control over local telephone networks to 
thwart competition for long-distance calls.41 The resulting antitrust 
investigation resulted in the landmark 1984 consent decree that broke 
up the Bell system and ultimately led to a competitive  
telephone industry.42 
PURPA helped jumpstart the development of an independent 
renewable electricity industry in the 1980s. From 1980 to 1989, 1100  
37. § 210(c), 92 Stat. at 3144–45 (stating that the rates “shall be just and 
reasonable” and “shall not discriminate against the qualifying 
cogenerators”). 
38. § 202, 92 Stat. at 3135. 
39. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
40. Id. at 377. The customer in question was a municipal utility that 
provided power to the city but lay completely within the defendant’s 
service area and thus was dependent on the defendant’s transmission 
network to receive any power the municipality did not generate itself. 
Id. at 371. 
41. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
MCI’s complaint included counts of “monopolization, attempt to 
monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize—all under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act—and conspiracy in restraint of trade—under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.” Id. at 1092. 
42. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226 (D.D.C. 1982). The 
decree was entered in 1982 and took effect in 1984. 
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megawatts of wind capacity were added to the grid, compared to only 
17 megawatts in the 1970s.43 Geothermal energy (which uses the 
Earth’s natural heat to generate electricity) saw 2135 megawatts 
installed in the 1980s, compared to 550 megawatts in the 1970s.44 
Wood-fueled power experienced additions of 1523 megawatts in the 
1980s, compared to 212 megawatts in the 1970s.45 Solar and other 
renewable generation grew as well. While renewable generation was 
still a small portion of total installed capacity in 1989, it had gained a 
toehold and was the fastest-growing segment of the generation 
market. Notably, most of this growth occurred in only a handful of 
states.46 PURPA allowed state regulators to oversee the terms of sales 
agreements between qualifying facilities and traditional utilities, and 
some states, most notably California, interpreted this mandate more 
aggressively than others.47 
The growth of independent electricity generators created 
significant pressure for regulators to mandate nondiscriminatory 
access to utility-owned transmission networks.48 Although independent 
power generators were slowly bringing competition to the wholesale 
electricity market, many thought this competition was retarded by 
the utilities’ continued monopoly over the transmission segment. 
Vertically integrated utilities had little incentive to provide 
transmission facilities to independent generators who competed 
against the utility’s own electricity generation facilities. Without 
transmission, independent generators’ opportunities to sell electricity 
were limited. FERC regulators agreed: although the Commission 
lacked authority under PURPA to order open access outright, 
throughout the 1980s it used its merger approval authority 
opportunistically to attach conditions requiring post-merger entities to 
provide transmission services to independent electricity generators.49 
The Energy Policy Act of 199250 expanded access to the 
transmission grid. The Act granted FERC greater authority to require  
43. See Peskoe, supra note 10, at 230 (analyzing data reported in U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., 2009 Electric Generator Report, eia.gov, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html (follow 2009 
“ZIP” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 21, 2014)). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 231. 
47. Id. 
48. Spence, supra note 9, at 276. 
49. See Joseph T. Kelliher, Pushing the Envelope: Development of Federal 
Electric Transmission Access Policy, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 543, 553 n.43, 
606 (1992) (discussing FERC’s indirect use of its merger authority).  
50. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13201 
(2012)). 
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utilities to provide transmission services to independent electricity 
producers (an arrangement known as “wheeling”).51 But this authority 
was incomplete: FERC could only order wheeling of specific utilities 
upon the request of an electricity generator, and only upon a finding 
that wheeling would serve the public interest.52 The 1992 Act also 
made it easier for independent electricity generators to enter the 
market and introduced tax credits for construction of certain 
renewable resources.53 
Ultimately, FERC imposed an open access requirement on the 
entire transmission system, not because of a new grant of authority 
from Congress, but by reinterpreting its original statutory mandate. 
As noted above, section 205 of the Federal Power Act requires 
utilities to sell interstate power and transmission at “just and 
reasonable rates” and refrain from “undue prejudice or 
disadvantage.”54 Section 206 allows the Commission to remedy 
“unduly discriminatory or preferential” practices.55 Drawing upon this 
statutory language, the Commission issued Order 888 in 1996, which 
requires all public utilities that transmit electricity in interstate 
commerce to file nondiscriminatory open access transmission tariffs 
with the Commission.56 Under Order 888, independent producers of 
renewable energy could now purchase transmission services from 
utilities at the same rate the utility charged itself, to sell its electricity 
to a wider audience of potential customers. 
C. State Growth in Demand for Renewable Energy 
As federal policy was making it easier to supply renewable 
electricity to the market, state renewable portfolio standards 
stimulated demand for the product. Iowa adopted the nation’s first 
renewable portfolio standard in 1983, when the state passed an 
Alternative Energy Production law requiring its two investor-owned 
utilities to contract for a combined total of 105 megawatts of 
 
51. § 721, 106 Stat. at 2915. PURPA had given FERC limited authority to 
order wheeling by a recalcitrant utility, but because of the conditions 
Congress placed on that authority, FERC never exercised it. See supra 
note 32 and accompanying text. 
52. § 721, 106 Stat. at 2915 (requiring certain rates and conditions for 
issuing an order for a wholesale transmission service). 
53. Id. (granting certain benefits to entities that control and deliver electric 
energy to consumers). 
54. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a), (b) (2012). 
55. § 824e(a). 
56. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 21,540 (Apr. 21, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). 
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generation from renewable energy resources,57 an amount equal to a 
mere two percent of the state’s overall energy consumption.58 Since 
then, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
renewable portfolio standards, alternative energy portfolios, or 
voluntary goals to encourage growth in renewable energy generation.59 
State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) typically require a 
specified percentage of annual electricity sales to be generated from 
renewable resources. The percentage varies significantly from state to 
state. For example, Minnesota requires that twenty-five percent of its 
total electricity consumption come from renewable sources by 2025.60 
California has been even more aggressive, mandating twenty-five 
percent by 2016 and thirty-three percent by 2020.61 At the other end 
of the spectrum, North Carolina mandates only 12.5 percent by 
2021.62 Virginia has targeted fifteen percent by 2025, but its goal is 
merely voluntary.63 
The definition of “renewable energy” also varies among states. 
Every state gives credit for electricity generated from wind, 
photovoltaic solar, biomass, and methane, and all but one include 
thermal solar generation.64 But only twenty-nine states count 
geothermal energy toward the total, and only twenty-three include 
ocean and tidal energy.65 States are also divided regarding whether to 
consider large hydroelectric power as part of their overall goal. While 
hydroelectric generation is emission-free, some argue that large 
hydroelectric dams have other deleterious effects on the environment 
 
57. Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, Why Do States Adopt Renewable 
Portfolio Standards?: An Empirical Investigation, 31 Energy J. 133, 
134 (2010). 
58. Christine Real de Azua, The Future of Wind Energy, 14 Tul. Envtl. 
L.J. 485, 501 (2001). 
59. See Database for St. Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 
supra note 2. 
60. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 216B.1691(2a) (West Supp. 2014). 
61. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.30(c)(2) (West Supp. 2014). 
62. See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, Database for St. 
Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (Mar. 2013), http:// 
www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf (giving an 
overview of the renewable portfolio standard policies of states and 
territories).  
63. See Virginia: Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, 
Database for St. Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency 
(Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm? Incen-
tive_Code=VA10R. 
64. Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 
42 Conn. L. Rev. 1339, 1376 (2010). 
65. Id. 
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and therefore should not be encouraged through RPS standards.66 
States also vary regarding which electricity utilities are subject to the 
requirement. Some states place renewable portfolio restrictions only 
on investor-owned utilities, while others include alternative electricity 
distributors such as municipal utilities and rural electric 
cooperatives.67 These limitations affect the overall impact of the 
renewable portfolio standard: Illinois, for example, has a somewhat 
aggressive goal of twenty-five percent by 2025,68 but the standard only 
applies to one-third of total electricity sales in the state.69 
In some, but not all states, utilities subject to the standard may 
meet the law’s requirements by purchasing renewable energy credits 
(RECs) from out-of-state renewable suppliers. RECs are tradable 
certificates meant to represent the environmental benefit of renewable 
energy. A renewable energy generator that participates in REC 
markets may issue a REC for each megawatt of renewable energy 
produced, which virtually decouples the environmental benefit from 
the electricity itself. Utilities needing to meet resource portfolio 
standards in REC-friendly states may purchase RECs in lieu of 
generating or purchasing renewable electricity. Once the REC is 
unbundled, the renewable energy generator remains free to sell the 
underlying megawatt in the electricity market, but cannot market it 
as a renewable resource. Because some states produce renewable 
energy more efficiently than others, one state’s renewable portfolio 
standard can lead a utility to purchase RECs from renewable 
generators in other states and thus fund the development of 
renewable resources throughout a region.70 
II. Challenges to Renewable Energy Development 
As states increase their demand for renewable electricity, 
policymakers and industry participants will inevitably come under 
greater pressure to expand the renewable power sector. To do so, they 
must confront several obstacles that inhibit the growth of renewable 
energy. These obstacles include local opposition to new electricity 
generation facilities, lack of transmission infrastructure to carry 
 
66. See id. at 1377–78 (noting, for example, that Arizona counts only 
projects with 10 megawatts of capacity or less, while California counts 
up to 30 megawatts if the project does not impact “instream beneficial 
use” and Maine counts projects up to 100 megawatts). 
67. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1810 (observing differing renewable 
portfolio restrictions between states and municipalities). 
68. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/I–75 (West Supp. 2013). 
69. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1810.  
70. See id. at 1810–11 (noting how the RECs in neighboring states can 
drive the “need for additional regional transmission projects”). 
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renewable electricity to load centers, and grid instability fostered by 
the intermittent nature of many renewable resources. 
A. Local Opposition to Renewable Generation Facilities 
Companies seeking to construct new renewable power generating 
facilities often find their efforts thwarted by local opposition. This 
phenomenon is particularly prominent when considering wind 
turbines, which often attract significant community criticism. 
Although some communities welcome the investment, jobs, and lease 
payments that wind farms bring to a local community, these projects 
often face significant hurdles and fierce opposition. Ashira Ostrow 
quotes one energy siting consultant as remarking that “wind energy is 
fast becoming ‘the mother of all NIMBY wars.’”71 
Often the local residents’ concerns are primarily aesthetic. Many 
wind farms are located in mostly rural areas. In many cases, the 
proposed wind turbines, which can measure up to twenty-five stories 
tall, would dominate a landscape that contains no structures more 
imposing than a grain silo.72 Community activists resent the intrusion 
on what would otherwise be open rural, agricultural landscapes. 
Others focus on the fact that spoiling scenic views (such as the ocean 
views of Nantucket Sound off Cape Cod) can impact local property 
values and tourist revenue.73  
Perhaps surprisingly, environmental groups sometimes oppose 
wind farms, because of the potential risk of bird strikes and other 
wildlife harm. The Center for Biological Diversity unsuccessfully sued 
the owners of wind turbines in the Altamont Pass Wind Resource 
Area, one of California’s oldest and largest wind farms, alleging the 
wind farms killed birds in violation of the public trust doctrine.74 
More recently, Duke Energy Corporation pleaded guilty and paid a $1 
million fine in late 2013 to settle a Justice Department suit alleging 
 
71. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 
48 Harv. J. on Legis. 289, 336 (2011) (citations omitted). NIMBY, 
short for “Not In My Backyard,” is a common term used to define local 
opposition to a proposed facility. 
72. Tom Stanton, Put It There! Wind Energy & Wind-Park Siting 
and Zoning Best Practices and Guidance for States 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.naruc.org/Publications/FINAL%20FINAL% 
20NRRI_Wind_Siting_Jan12-03.pdf. 
73. See Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism 
and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 1049, 1074–75 (2009) (observing the concern of some residents 
that installing wind farms will have a negative effect on tourism and 
property value). 
74. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
588, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
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that a Wyoming wind farm killed several eagles and other birds 
protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.75  
Other concerns sound in nuisance or public health and safety. 
Residents sometimes complain about the potential noise of wind 
turbines, although Patricia Salkin and Ashira Ostrow note that noise 
levels, like bird strikes, have decreased in recent years with industry 
experience and technological advancements.76 In Falmouth, 
Massachusetts, several residents allege in a lawsuit that local turbines 
have given them “wind turbine syndrome,” a controversial diagnosis 
marked by headaches, vertigo, and insomnia.77 Other complaints 
include safety threats from falling blades or ice thrown from blades, 
construction-related damage to nearby roads, and interference with 
microwaves and telecommunications signals.78  
Of course, community opposition is common to many new 
electricity generation projects, not just wind. Anti-nuclear activists 
fought a high-profile battle against nuclear power in the 1970s and 
1980s,79 and again following the 2011 Fukushima disaster.80 Similarly, 
traditional fossil fuel plants are often subject to challenge because of 
the air pollution they generate. PJM Interconnection, which manages 
portions of the electricity grid in the northeastern United States, 
noted that “increasingly contentious local opposition to siting” of new 
generation facilities made it unlikely that new generation capacity 
 
75. See Dina Capiello, Guilty Plea in Bird Deaths at Wind Farms a First, 
Associated Press, Nov. 23, 2013, available at http://news. 
yahoo.com/guilty-plea-bird-deaths-wind-farms-first-081651963--
finance.html (detailing the conditions under which Duke Energy Corp. 
pleaded guilty). 
76. See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 73, at 1072–73 (claiming that 
advancing technology has reduced wildlife deaths to an “anomaly” and 
has positively affected noise levels) (citation omitted). 
77. See Susan Donaldson James, “Wind Turbine Syndrome” Blamed for 
Mysterious Symptoms in Cape Cod Town, ABC News, Oct. 21, 2013, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wind-turbine-syndrome-blamed-
mysterious-symptoms-cape-cod/story?id=20591168 (describing the 
conditions under which the Hobarts filed a nuisance lawsuit). 
78. Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 73, at 1075. 
79. See, e.g., Tanya Mortensen, An Unattainable Wedge: Four Limiting 
Effects on the Expansion of Nuclear Power, 5 Envtl. & Energy L. & 
Pol’y J. 60, 79–80 (2010) (following Chernobyl and TMI, protesters 
forced the shutdown of numerous nuclear plants). 
80. See “We Want to Fight for This Cause”: Nuclear Refugees from 
Fukushima Join Anti-Nuke Protests, Democracy Now!, Jan. 17, 2014, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/1/17/we_want_to_fight_for_this 
(providing a rough transcript of the interviewed accounts of those 
joining the Fukushima Refugees protests).  
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would be added in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area to meet 
future demand increases.81 
But wind siting disputes are different than fossil fuel siting 
disputes, in three key ways. First, the nature of the costs and the 
benefits of the project are different, which can affect how the 
community weighs approval of a project. The primary costs of fossil 
fuel plants (largely air pollution and increased carbon emissions) are 
regional or national in scope. But the benefit, electrical power, is often 
enjoyed by the local community, because many fossil fuel plants are 
located near the load centers that they serve. By comparison, the 
primary costs of wind power (aesthetics, nuisances, and safety risks) 
are borne locally, while the primary benefit (reduced emissions) is 
enjoyed by the nation as a whole. Therefore when assessing a wind 
project, a community is more likely to recognize most of the harm but 
only reap a portion of the benefit—and this imbalance is exacerbated 
when the proposed wind farm is in an area of low population density 
and would therefore be exporting much of its generation. At the 
margin, it is possible that communities will reject wind farms even if 
they produce a net benefit to society as a whole. 
Second, new fossil fuel capacity tends to be sited in different 
environments than new wind capacity. As Salkin and Ostrow note, 
fossil fuel plants are often built in industrial areas, where the 
landscape is already afflicted by progress and additional aesthetic 
harm is a difference of degree rather than kind.82 But wind projects 
are often located in undeveloped places, which can generate more 
opposition. Robert Kahn observes that “[a] project which fits into a 
preexisting industrial mold is not likely to be accused of ruining the 
landscape. A renewable energy project is not as lucky. Americans put 
a high value on wilderness and open space. Sparks fly when lands 
viewed as public viewscapes . . . appear threatened.”83 
Finally, renewable projects are more likely than fossil fuel projects 
to be site-specific. Fossil fuels are portable. If a local jurisdiction 
denies a particular project, the company can seek out another site in 
the vicinity that may serve as an adequate substitute. But wind and 
solar generation depend on site-specific criteria. Wind turbines can 
only be located where the wind blows with regularity and strength 
sufficient to produce cost-efficient electricity. And utility-scale solar 
projects must be built in hot, arid climates were solar power is 
strongest and weather is least likely to interfere with operations. The 
 
81. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 2007 Regional Transmission 
Expansion Plan 66 (2008), available at http://pjm.com/~/media/ 
documents/reports/2007-rtep/2007-section3a.ashx.  
82. Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 73, at 1071. 
83. Robert D. Kahn, Siting Struggles: The Unique Challenge of Permitting 
Renewable Energy Power Plants, Electricity J., Mar. 2000, at 21, 23. 
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denial of a permit to build on a particular site is often not a delay 
until an alternative site is found, but instead a more permanent denial 
of an opportunity to add to the nation’s renewable energy capacity. 
B. Transmission Challenges 
The development of new renewable energy is somewhat of a 
“chicken and egg” problem: power companies are reluctant to develop 
new renewable generation facilities without adequate transmission 
capacity to bring the electricity to load centers.84 But transmission 
companies are unlikely to build lines to new areas without a 
guarantee that there will be sufficient generation in the area to make 
the lines cost-effective.85  
The need for additional transmission capacity is one of the most 
significant stumbling blocks to further development of renewable 
energy. As Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson note, the “first 
generation” of installed wind was often located in areas served by 
existing transmission capacity.86 With this low-hanging fruit gone, the 
“second generation” of renewable energy will likely require new 
transmission lines to connect these energy sources to the power grid.  
Of course, renewable generation is inextricably intertwined with 
transmission investment. And as noted above, because renewable 
electricity is location-constrained, new generation cannot simply be 
built in a convenient location close to existing transmission lines and 
load centers. Some of the greatest wind and solar potential lies in the 
prairie states and the southwestern United States, respectively. But 
these are remote areas that are not sufficiently connected to the 
existing transmission grid. Transmission line upgrades can be both 
slow and expensive: the estimated cost of upgrading the Western 
Interconnection grid to integrate just currently planned renewable 
projects within the grid’s footprint is $200 billion.87 
Constructing new transmission lines is also difficult because of the 
fragmented regulatory authority over the transmission system. As 
noted above, FERC regulates interstate power sales and oversees 
operation of the existing transmission system. But while the agency 
has assumed for itself a role in planning future transmission capacity  
84. Stan Mark Kaplan, Cong. Research Serv., R40511, Electric 
Power Transmission: Background and Policy Issues 19 (2009); 
Jennifer E. Gardner & Ronald L. Lehr, Enabling the Widespread 
Adoption of Wind Energy in the Western United States: The Case for 
Transmission, Operations and Market Reforms, 31 J. Energy & Nat. 
Res. L. 237, 249 (2013). 
85. See Gardner & Lehr, supra note 84, at 249 (“[T]ransmission is often not 
built because it is not clear that renewable energy projects will actually 
be developed to use the transmission.”). 
86. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1811. 
87. Id. at 1812.  
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projects, it lacks general authority to approve the siting of new 
transmission lines.88 That authority remains with state and local 
officials. To construct an interstate transmission line from a resource-
rich Midwestern state to a coastal load center, the applicant must pay 
for, and receive, regulatory approval from each state along the line’s 
path, and often various local authorities as well.89 These applications 
are costly to prepare and can subject even the most obviously 
beneficial projects to lengthy regulatory delays. And since each state 
along the line has an effective veto right, any one of them can 
effectively eliminate the line or extract rents as a condition  
of approval. 
Like generation siting authority, the placement of transmission 
line siting authority at the state or local level raises the possibility 
that parochial opposition will delay or eliminate a proposal that is a 
net benefit to society. Like wind turbines, the installation of new 
high-voltage power lines often draws substantial local opposition, both 
in populated areas and more rural environments.90 Power lines are 
aesthetically displeasing, especially when poised to cross recreational 
land, scenic trails, or parks.91 They also interfere with activities like 
crop dusting and can be dangerous when downed by storms or 
accidents. Given these local costs, many state and local officials are 
unwilling to approve a transmission project that does not directly 
benefit that area, even if there is a clear regional or national benefit 
from installing the line.92  
One sees the parochial nature of such decisions in the saga 
surrounding California Edison’s proposed 230-mile transmission line 
from California to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in 
Arizona in 2005. Although the line would be funded entirely by 
California ratepayers, and the California Public Utilities Commission 
approved the California portion of the line,93 the Arizona Corporation  
88. Id. at 1815. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 gave FERC limited backstop 
authority to approve interstate transmission lines under limited 
circumstances, but the agency has been unable to exercise that 
authority. See infra Part III.A. 
89. See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line 
Siting Authority, 39 Envtl. L. 1015, 1018–33 (2009) (outlining the 
various problems associated with erecting interstate transmission lines).  
90. James A. Holtkamp & Mark A. Davidson, Transmission Siting in the 
Western United States: Getting Green Electrons to Market, 46 Idaho L. 
Rev. 379, 381 (2010) (discussing the “NIMBY syndrome” as related to 
electric transmission lines). 
91. Id.  
92. Id. 
93. S. Cal. Edison Co., 07-01-040 2007 WL 951285, at *2, *52 (Cal. P.U.C. 
Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/ 
FINAL_DECISION/64017.pdf. 
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Commission rejected the line.94 Ostensibly, Arizona rejected the line 
because of environmental concerns. But in an accompanying press 
release, one commissioner stated, “[i]t comes down to this: California 
wants to drop a 230-mile extension cord into Arizona at a time when 
Arizona is the fastest growing state in the nation.”95 Another 
explained, “I don’t want Arizona to become an energy farm for 
California. This project, if we approved it, would use our land, our air 
and our water to provide electricity to California.”96 Importantly, the 
Supreme Court long ago ruled that the Commerce Clause prohibited 
one state from hoarding its electrical power for its own residents.97 
Yet Arizona used its transmission siting authority to accomplish 
precisely this goal. 
As Ashley Brown and Jim Rossi have explored at length, several 
states’ siting laws also act as barriers to transmission construction.98 
Many state public utility commissions must certify that new 
construction is in the “public interest,” which requires them to 
balance the benefits and the costs of the new line, but only with focus 
on in-state residents.99 This standard, a relic of the era of vertically 
integrated intrastate utility operations, can be the death knell of 
transmission projects that are beneficial to the country as a whole but 
a net negative to residents within a particular state that the line must 
traverse. In other states, entities that are not classified as in-state 
utilities holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity may 
be ineligible to build a transmission line, or may not qualify to use 
eminent domain like a utility would.100 
The dearth of recent transmission construction projects testifies to 
the difficulties under the existing model. Alexandra Klass notes that 
although demand for electricity rose twenty-five percent from 1990 
until 2009, construction of new transmission lines fell by thirty 
 
94. S. Cal. Edison Co., 69638 2007 WL 2126365, at *1 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n 
June 6, 2007), available at http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/ docketpdf/ 
0000073735.pdf. 
95. Press Release, Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, Regulators Reject “Extension Cord 
for Cal.”: Comm’rs Reject Palo Verde to Devers II Power Line 1 (May 
30, 2007), available at http://www.azcc.gov/divisions/administration/ 
news/Devers_II_Vote.pdf (quoting Commissioner Kris Mayes). 
96. Id. at 2 (quoting Commissioner Bill Mundell); see also Rossi, supra note 
89, at 1022. 
97. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). 
98. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 89; Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting 
Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the 
“Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 705 (2010). 
99. Brown & Rossi, supra note 98, at 706–07. 
100. Id. at 720. 
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percent.101 Klass further notes that “[b]etween 2000 and 2008, the 
United States added only 668 total miles of interstate transmission 
lines.”102 New transmission construction is particularly important for 
renewable energy, whose best sources lie largely in sparsely populated 
areas without sufficient transmission capacity to carry the electricity 
to the existing grid. This results, says Klass, in “new renewable 
generation sources waiting for years to connect to the transmission 
grid in many regions of the country.”103 
While there are many reasons for this phenomenon, the American 
Society of Civil Engineers echoes the views of many by citing “[o]verly 
stringent permitting requirements, lawsuits, and other regulatory 
issues” as the primary culprits.104 One finds support for this assertion 
in the high incidence of new construction that takes advantage of 
various loopholes to avoid state-by-state siting approval. For example, 
several currently planned interstate transmission construction projects 
will occur largely on federal land, particularly those designed to bring 
more renewable energy to the grid. These include SunZia, a proposed 
500-mile line to bring wind and solar energy across the southwestern 
United States, and the Zephyr Project, a proposed 950-mile line from 
eastern Wyoming to the Southwest, both of which seek to put 
significant portions of the line on land managed by the federal Bureau 
of Land Management.105 The federal government has authority to 
permit construction on federal land, which bypasses potentially more 
cumbersome state procedures. In addition, a number of new projects 
are so-called “merchant lines,” which are privately owned and 
financed by nonutilities. Because the merchant-line owners are not 
subject to Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction, they can 
sometimes sidestep Commission “public interest” review. SunZia and 
Zephyr are both merchant-line projects, as is the recently completed 
Cross-Sound Cable from Connecticut to Long Island, New York.106 
Cost allocation is also a significant challenge for new transmission 
generation. Traditionally, state public utility commissions factor 
transmission costs into the retail rate base for utility customers, on 
 
101. Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1079, 
1084 (2013). This mismatch stemmed in part from conscious efforts by 
utilities to use their transmission capacity more efficiently. This means 
more lines run closer to full capacity, which reduces system redundancy 
and therefore stability. 
102. Id. at 1085. 
103. Id. at 1116. 
104. Id. at 1086 (citing Am. Soc’y Civil Eng’rs, 2009 Report Card for 
America’s Infrastructure 136 (2009), http://www. infrastructure 
reportcard.org/2009/sites/default/files/RC2009_full_ report.pdf). 
105. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1826–27. 
106. Klass, supra note 101, at 1122. 
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the theory that transmission costs are part of the costs of providing 
service to those customers.107 Of course, not all of a utility’s 
transmission capacity serves its retail customers; some is sold to other 
utilities through wheeling arrangements. Ratemakers generally adjust 
for this by granting retail customers a credit for wheeling and other 
revenues that the utility receives from transmission activities. But as 
Rossi notes, this leaves the retail customers bearing the residual risk 
of transmission costs—risk that would be better divided among the 
utility’s various transmission customers.108 At the margin, this can 
lead state regulators to deny approval of transmission projects that 
impose significant residual risk on consumers who do not benefit from 
the project. And even where costs are allocated across the line owner’s 
transmission customers, significant disputes arise about which entities 
should bear which costs, which can hamstring complex, expensive 
interstate transmission projects.  
C. Grid Stability Challenges 
Renewable generation also endangers the stability of the 
electricity grid’s ongoing operations. Because electricity is not easily 
stored, electricity supply must constantly match electricity demand. 
At any given time, the amount of energy that generators dispatch to 
an electricity grid must match the amount that consumers are taking 
off the grid. Otherwise blackouts may result.109 In the days of 
vertically integrated monopolies, the utility performed this load 
management function internally, bringing on additional generation as 
needed to meet demand and managing fluctuations in the electricity 
supply.110 Today, many utilities source their electricity from 
generators in wholesale markets, through long-term power contracts 
coupled with instantaneous spot markets to fill momentary demand 
variations. 
Renewable energy exacerbates the already-challenging task of grid 
management because renewable energy tends to be intermittent rather 
than constant and is often difficult to predict. Unlike fossil fuel or 
nuclear generators, which can be activated or idled on planned 
schedules, wind turbines generate electricity only when the wind 
blows, and the power produced varies as wind speeds change. 
Similarly, solar panels generate more electricity when the sun is 
shining and skies are not overcast.111 And unfortunately, nature does 
 
107. Brown & Rossi, supra note 98, at 727. 
108. Id. 
109. See Spence, supra note 9, at 273–74 (“If [generation and consumption] 
loads are not balanced, the system will fail, causing blackouts . . . .”). 
110. Id. at 274–75. 
111. See David J. Hurlbut, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., 
Colorado’s Prospects for Interstate Commerce in Renewable 
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not always accede to meet peak demand, nor can excess energy be 
stored away for use during high-demand periods. Generally, grid 
operators seek to dispatch electricity to the grid in “ascending order 
of marginal cost.”112 Because the marginal costs of renewable 
generation is nearly zero, it is dispatched first. But anytime 
intermittent, unpredictable sources of renewable energy are 
dispatched to the system, overall grid stability suffers because the 
electricity is subject to reduction or interruption without notice. 
To meet this challenge, grid operators must maintain reliable 
backup reserves that can ramp up quickly to fill gaps in demand.113 
Fossil fuel generators such as natural gas or coal can meet this need 
most efficiently, but their use negatively impacts the environmental 
benefits of renewable generation. Even in a backup role, natural gas 
and coal reactors must remain “spinning,” burning fuel and producing 
emissions, to reduce the lag time from dispatch to delivery of backup 
electricity.114 And if these generators are constantly cycled up and 
down to fill the gaps created by renewable energy variation, they will 
operate less efficiently than if they were running at a constant rate. 
This means they will consume more fuel per megawatt-hour generated 
and will see greater wear and tear on the power plant.115 Nuclear 
power has a significant lag between startup and delivery of electricity 
to the grid, which reduces its usefulness as a source of backup power. 
Most other generation sources lack the scale to serve as effective 
sources of backup generation. 
Over time, industry maturity and technological advancement may  
give grid operators additional tools to address the variability of wind 
and other intermittent renewable generation. For example, 
development of energy storage solutions such as pumped hydro (which 
uses excess electricity capacity during periods of low demand to pump 
water uphill, which can then be used to generate hydroelectric power 
during peak times) may provide an alternative to backup generators 
to fill gaps in energy supply. Diversifying wind production across 
several different geographic areas within a grid area can reduce the 
variation in total wind energy delivered to the grid, because 
momentary losses of generation in one area may be offset by 
momentary generation increases elsewhere. And better predictive 
models can give grid operators more insight into variation, allowing 
 
Power 16 (2009) (discussing the difficulties wind and solar power 
create for “routine grid operations”). 
112. Spence, supra note 9, at 288. 
113. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1811. 
114. Spence, supra note 9, at 289 
115. Id. 
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them to be better prepared when renewable energy is interrupted.116 
But these potential future innovations do little now to alleviate the 
pressure that grid operators currently face as greater amounts of 
renewable energy come online. 
D. Demand Side Concerns 
Finally, several commentators have found fault with state-driven 
renewable portfolio standards. Although these critics recognize that 
state standards have played an important role in stimulating demand 
for renewable generation, they recognize two problems with state-
based renewable energy targets.  
First, state standards vary with regard to their renewable targets, 
which renewable resources count toward those targets, whether 
tradable REC certificates can satisfy renewable portfolio 
requirements, and compliance mechanisms. As one commentator put 
it, “[i]f America’s interstate highway system were structured like our 
renewable energy market, drivers would be forced to change engines, 
tire pressure, and fuel mixture every time they crossed state lines.”117 
A uniform definition would unify the market, allowing for greater 
economies of scale in renewable energy and reducing the costs and 
risks of investment in renewable generation.118  
Second, state-based initiatives create somewhat of a free-rider 
problem. The environmental benefits of substituting renewable energy 
for traditional fossil fuels are regional or national in scope. But 
because renewable energy is more expensive than conventional power, 
the costs are borne largely by customers in states that have enacted 
renewable portfolio standards. Those states that have not enacted 
binding renewable requirements are, in essence, reaping the benefits of 
renewable energy without shouldering their share of the costs.119  
III. Federal Preemption of Electricity Regulation 
and Its Alternatives 
A. Federal Governance Through Preemption 
Many proponents of renewable energy have looked toward federal 
preemption as a solution to all or part of these obstacles. Some of 
these efforts have been successful: for example, the Energy Policy Act 
 
116. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1811. 
117. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got it Wrong: 
The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications 
for Policy, 3 Envtl. & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 85, 92 (2008). 
118. Id.; see also Davies, supra note 64, at 1366. 
119. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 15 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 1, 9–13 
(2007). 
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of 2005120 gave the federal government limited backstop authority over 
transmission siting issues,121 although, as detailed below, legal 
challenges have precluded the agency from exercising that 
authority.122 Other proposed legislation would go further. In 2009, for 
example, members of Congress introduced at least five different bills 
that would have granted FERC increased oversight of new 
transmission line construction projects.123 Perhaps the most prominent 
of these was the mammoth American Clean Energy and Security Act 
of 2009,124 better known as the Waxman-Markey Bill. While the 
Waxman-Markey Bill was most famous for its attempt to create a 
federal cap-and-trade provision for greenhouse gases, other provisions 
would have expanded federal oversight of transmission decisions, 
including establishing a FERC-supervised regional transmission 
planning process and expanding the agency’s backstop siting 
authority.125 The bill also would have established a federal minimum 
resource portfolio requirement of six percent of electric power from 
renewable resources by 2012, rising to twenty percent by 2020.126 
Though the bill passed the House, it was never considered by  
the Senate. 
There is little dispute that the federal government could regulate 
virtually the entire electricity industry, if it chose to do so. Over 
thirty years ago, the Supreme Court explained in Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi127 that Congress could have 
preempted the field of electricity regulation completely and that 
continued state regulation exists merely because Congress allows it. 
The deregulation of electricity generation and the growth of renewable 
energy have only increased the interstate character of the industry in 
the years since.  
Moreover, federal preemption is not an unprecedented solution to 
coordination problems, particularly in the energy sector. As far back 
as 1938, the Natural Gas Act128 granted the Federal Power 
Commission (now FERC) with exclusive jurisdiction over construction 
 
120. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
121. § 1221. 
122. See infra text accompanying notes 197–99. 
123. See Tara Benedetti, Running Roughshod? Extending Federal Siting 
Authority over Interstate Electric Transmission Lines, 47 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 253, 261–67 (2010) (summarizing legislation). 
124. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
125. H.R. 2454, § 151. 
126. H.R. 2454, § 101. 
127. 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982). 
128. Pub. L. No. 688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717).  
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of interstate natural gas pipelines and facilities, including siting 
authority.129 In 2005, FERC and California clashed over whether that 
authority extended to liquefied natural gas facilities that lie entirely 
within a state.130 At FERC’s request, Congress settled the dispute by 
granting FERC “exclusive authority to approve or deny an 
application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an 
LNG terminal.”131  
But the question of whether Congress could preempt state 
electricity regulation is quite different, and far easier, than the 
question of whether, and to what extent, it should do so. The answer 
to this question turns upon the relative strength of federal actors as 
regulators vis-à-vis their state counterparts. While federalism scholars 
have identified several potential justifications for a move toward more 
centralized regulation,132 two stand out as potentially applicable to the 
renewable energy debate: controlling spillover effects and the need for 
uniformity or harmonization. 
In the context of federalism, spillovers occur when a regulator’s 
activities have effects beyond the scope of the regulator’s jurisdiction. 
In economic terms these are known as externalities. As Professor (and 
former Judge) Michael McConnell explains:  
[e]xternalities present the principal countervailing consideration 
in favor of centralized government: if the costs of government 
action are borne by the citizens of State C, but the benefits are 
shared by the citizens of States D, E, and F, State C will be 
unwilling to expend the level of resources commensurate with 
the full social benefit of the action.133  
 
129. See, e.g., N. Natural Gas Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 821 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that federal regulations and the NGA occupy the 
field of “extension, operation, and acquisition of natural gas facilities,” 
thereby preempting any state authority to do so). 
130. Sound Energy Solutions, 106 FERC ¶ 61,279 (2004) (declaratory order 
asserting exclusive jurisdiction). 
131. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 311(c)(2), 119 Stat. 
686 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)). 
132. See, e.g., Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 Conn. L. 
Rev. 217, 227 (2012) (discussing transboundary issues, the need for 
uniformity, avoiding a race to the bottom by state regulators, 
countering NIMBY opposition, and providing public goods that require 
resource pooling) (citing Robert Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A 
Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 594–600 (2008)).  
133. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 
54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1495 (1987). 
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To control spillover effects, the policy choice should be vested at a 
level large enough that decisions reflect the full costs and full benefits 
of the proposed action.134  
Preemption also has the benefit of uniformity: it replaces a 
patchwork of potentially inconsistent or contradictory standards with 
a single rule and a single government interface. Uniformity reduces 
the transaction costs of compliance with government mandates, as a 
company need only approach a single federal authority to seek 
regulatory action, guidance, or exemption. Uniformity also reduces 
uncertainty: a company can enter a regional or national market 
knowing the legal framework that will govern the service throughout 
the market, with minimal risk that the law will suddenly shift in part, 
but not all, of the applicable service area. 
When viewed through these lenses, one can understand why 
renewable energy advocates are drawn to preemption-based policy 
solutions. Expansion of the renewable power sector is an interstate 
matter. The central challenge is how to generate electricity in 
resource-rich Midwestern and Southwestern states and bring that 
electricity to load centers in other parts of the country. State and 
local officials with veto authority can block specific renewable 
generation facilities or transmission lines. As noted above, the costs of 
these facilities are largely local, but the benefits are regional or 
national in scope.135 Because the state decision maker is structurally 
inhibited from considering the full benefits of such facilities, a 
decentralized scheme makes it possible for parochial interests to block 
new construction that will be a net benefit to society. Preemption of 
siting authority would vest final decision making in a national official, 
whose scope of inquiry is large enough to encompass all of the costs 
and all of the benefits of a proposed facility. 
Preemption would also facilitate greater economies of scale in grid 
operations. In investing, diversification is often a successful strategy 
to mitigate risk from a volatile asset. Similarly, one can smooth the 
disruptions caused by intermittency of wind and solar energy by 
increasing the area from which the grid may dispatch power. Wind 
speeds may slow in eastern Colorado, but if they pick up in Wyoming 
or the sun comes out in New Mexico, the gains offset the losses as 
long as all the assets are tied to the same grid. And if scale alone does 
not smooth out renewable intermittency, a larger grid area increases 
the potential alternatives from which to source backup generation 
assets. Building interstate economies of scale may mean placing grid 
operations in the hands of a regulator above the state level. This 
 
134. Id. at 1494. 
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minimizes the likelihood that parochial interests will disrupt those 
economies of scale and unnecessarily destabilize the system.136 
Finally, preemption proponents claim that a national resource 
portfolio standard would provide uniformity and clarity to investors 
seeking to develop renewable generation. Lincoln Davies argues that 
by clarifying the rules and reducing uncertainty, a national standard 
would eliminate potential jurisdictional concerns and “make the 
renewables market more liquid, transparent, and uniform.”137 It would 
also increase total renewable electricity demand by eliminating the 
opportunity for states to free ride on the efforts of their neighbors.138 
B. The Matching Principle and Regional Governance 
On first glance, therefore, federal preemption appears to be an 
attractive option for overcoming the obstacles to renewable energy 
development. A federal approach would correct for state actors’ 
disincentives to consider interstate benefits of flowing renewable 
energy and eliminate free riding by recalcitrant fossil-fuel-friendly 
states. A uniform, consistent approach would also provide 
predictability and certainty to key industry players. 
But upon closer examination, much of this analysis merely 
suggests that state and local regulation alone is insufficient to solve 
the problem of renewable electricity. This does not necessarily imply 
that a federal solution is better. Traditional preemption analysis and 
dual federalism regimes like that created under the Federal Power Act 
often assume a false dichotomy between state and federal officials. 
The optimal jurisdiction may instead lie somewhere in between. 
McConnell warns that while it is “well understood” that 
externalities warn against placing national decisions in the hands of 
local officials, “[i]t is less well understood that nationalizing decisions 
where the impact is primarily local has an equal and opposite 
effect.”139 Centralized decision makers often lack the ability or 
inclination to understand how a project will impact a specific local 
community. This opens the door for one strong local or regional 
interest to capture the decision-making process and use it to shift 
 
136. Cf. Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular 
Phone Regulation?, 56 Fed. Comm. L.J. 155 (2003) (discussing the role 
of preemption in building and preserving national economies of scale for 
wireless telephone service). 
137. Davies, supra note 64, at 1366. 
138. See id. at 1366–67 (discussing the “value of renewable power” across 
state boundaries). 
139. McConnell, supra note 133, at 1495. 
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costs to less politically powerful regions.140 It is just as problematic to 
go “too large” in jurisdictional design as it is to go “too small.”  
Thus when designing a governing scheme, “[t]he unit of decision 
making must be large enough so that decisions reflect the full costs 
and benefits, but small enough that destructive competition for the 
benefits of central government action is minimized.”141 Henry Butler 
and Jonathan Macey have dubbed this approach “the Matching 
Principle.”142 The Matching Principle states that, in general, the size 
of the geographic area affected by a specific decision should determine 
the appropriate governmental level for regulation.143 Jonathan Adler 
and others have used the Matching Principle to diagnose 
jurisdictional mismatches in environmental policy.144 The approach is 
equally useful when examining any question of optimal jurisdiction 
analysis, including the challenges posed by renewable energy. 
Using the Matching Principle, one quickly realizes the error in 
traditional preemption analysis: for many issues, the relevant 
geographic area is not national, but regional. Many factors testify to 
the fact that electricity markets are regional in scope. Perhaps most 
fundamentally, electricity dissipates as it travels over transmission 
and distribution lines. This is known as “line loss.”145 Although it can 
be mitigated by using more expensive, higher-voltage transmission 
lines or DC transmission lines, line loss places physical limitations on 
the distance that electricity can travel economically between 
generators and load centers.  
This truth is reflected in the structure of the nation’s transmission 
system. Although policymakers often refer to the nation’s “electricity 
grid,” in fact the contiguous United States is divided into three 
 
140. Id. at 1496. McConnell cites the use of federal environmental laws to 
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separate grids, known as “interconnections.”146 The Continental 
Divide roughly separates the Western Interconnection from the much 
larger Eastern Interconnection, while most of Texas is on a separate 
Interconnection known as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, or 
ERCOT.147 These Interconnections developed organically over the 
past century as individual utilities slowly linked their transmission 
systems together to operate joint power plants or to sell surplus 
electricity to one another.148 Within each Interconnection, the AC grid 
must be precisely synchronized so that all generators rotate at sixty 
cycles per second. There are only eight low-capacity links, known as 
DC ties, connecting the Interconnections to one another. In essence, 
the continental United States is physically divided into three separate 
electricity grids with limited connections. 
  
 
146. See Kaplan, supra note 84, at 3. 
147. Id. at 3 fig.2. 
148. Id. at 3. ERCOT is a purely intrastate transmission system that Texas 
utilities purposely separated from the rest of the electricity grid in the 
1930s to avoid Federal Power Commission jurisdiction. See Ron Santini, 
Electric Transmission and Distribution Network, Pa. St. U., 
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog469/node/222 (last visited Feb. 
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Figure 1149 
 
But even this image gives the impression that regional electricity 
markets are much larger than they are. Within these three 
interconnections, approximately 130 different balancing authorities 
are charged with operating the grid.150 Each balancing authority is 
responsible for matching generation to demand within a specific 
geographic area on a real-time basis.151 These balancing authorities 
range in size from single-utility-sized authorities to massive multistate 
regional transmission organizations. Although some electricity flows 
between balancing authorities through a process known as “dynamic 
transfer,”152 these balancing authorities can be considered a rough 
proxy for regional electricity markets within which most generation, 
transmission, and distribution occurs.153 
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The Matching Principle thus suggests that many renewable 
energy challenges are thus best addressed through efforts at creating 
regional governance. But because regions are not distinct political 
entities like states or the national government, there is no obvious 
pre-existing institution in which to vest decision-making authority. 
The Matching Principle helps identify the appropriate size of the 
jurisdiction but offers little insight regarding how one might foster 
greater regional governance.  
C. Building Regional Governance Through Cooperative Federalism 
There are two primary ways that one might encourage regional 
governance. The first is a top-down approach, preempting state 
authority and replacing it with a series of regional institutions 
designed and overseen by federal authorities. The second is a bottom-
up approach, which uses incentives to encourage state and local 
officials to work together in pursuit of broader regional objectives. 
The issue of which strategy to pursue depends largely upon a 
weighing of the benefits of a more centralized governance structure 
against the potential gains from a more decentralized approach. 
Because it is a function of federal preemptive authority, top-down 
initiatives tend to benefit from the uniformity and consistency of 
preemptive models. Overall policy is set by the federal regulator and 
is imposed upon the regional structures, which act essentially as 
regional subdepartments of the federal government. This model is 
most appropriate when enforcing policies upon which there is a broad 
national consensus and where there is little difference among regions 
in ways that are relevant to carrying out the policy objective. In these 
situations, regional entities are less like policymakers and more like 
regional enforcement authorities, determining the best way to carry 
out the federal government’s will within a specific geographic region. 
In recent years, cooperative federalism has emerged as an 
alternative to top-down imposition of federal policies.154 As its name 
implies, cooperative federalism involves a shared power arrangement 
between the federal government and the states. Typically, the federal 
government sets the basic policy goals of a regulatory scheme, but 
states rather than federal subordinates are enlisted to carry out the 
mandate. These states are generally given some latitude in 
enforcement as long as they stay within the broad confines of the 
federal guidelines.155  
Phil Weiser explains “the cooperative federalism regulatory 
strategy makes sense where the benefits of allowing diversity in 
federal regulatory programs outweigh the benefits of demanding 
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uniformity in all situations.”156 It thus works well when the federal 
government has a broad policy that it wishes to pursue, but there is 
no clear consensus regarding precisely how that policy should be 
achieved. Cooperative federalism regimes then seek to capture many 
of the benefits of federalism and decentralized policymaking, while 
using a light federal touch to make sure state and local 
experimentation do not disrupt broader national objectives. Weiser 
and other commentators have identified several related ways in which 
cooperative federalism promotes policy diversity. 
The first is to allow states to tailor the application of the federal 
policy to local conditions.157 It is thus helpful in situations where local 
conditions differ in ways that are relevant to the broader federal 
scheme. Federal regulators often lack familiarity with the 
idiosyncrasies of a local area. By co-opting state and local officials 
who are much closer to the constituents that they serve, cooperative 
federalism allows policymakers to leverage local knowledge in pursuit 
of broader national or regional objective.158 
Second, cooperative federalism fosters competition between states. 
Within the confines of the federal scheme, different states can 
experiment with different policy approaches, allowing society to test 
empirically the results of particular policy choices. Citizens and 
businesses unsatisfied with a state’s approach may “vote with their 
feet” by relocating to a more hospitable regulatory climate; as 
jurisdictions tailor their policies to compete for such residents, society 
arrives at an efficient level of provision of public services.159 Although 
competition between states can sometimes result in a destructive race 
to the bottom, Weiser notes that “at least four decades of economic 
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the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692, 1698 
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159. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. 
Econ. 416 (1956). Of course, voting with one’s feet is expensive. 
Tiebout’s model only really affects those public goods that consumers 
determine are important enough to relocate. Public education and crime 
are quintessential examples. It is unclear whether the issues surrounding 
renewable energy generation are sufficiently important to the average 
residential consumer as to affect his or her choice of where to live. It 
may, however, be an important factor for businesses when deciding 
where to build operations. See Paul E. Peterson, City Limits 32–37 
(1981) (“[R]esidents can migrate freely from one community to another 
and, as a consequence, they will calculate the impact of local 
government decisions in choosing their community of residence.”). And 
of course, competition among states is likely to influence the deployment 
of renewable energy specifically within a state.  
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theory and empirical research” supports the notion that competition 
among states can produce better policy outcomes.160  
Third, cooperative federalism allows states to experiment with 
different ways to accomplish a federal objective. As Justice Kennedy 
aptly summarized, when “considerable disagreement exists about how 
best to accomplish [a] goal . . . the theory and utility of our federalism 
are revealed, for the States may perform their role as laboratories for 
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is 
far from clear.”161 This allows individual states to test new and 
innovative policy approaches without risking harm to the country as a 
whole.162 From these experiments, states may uncover new and better 
ways to accomplish federal goals that would have never been 
discovered had the country been subjected to a comprehensive federal 
scheme from the beginning.  
Finally, cooperative federalism helps preserve some of the 
accountability that decentralized government provides. A 
decentralized regime brings decision making closer to the people 
affected by regulation.163 Local governments are responsible for a 
much smaller polity than their federal counterparts, and therefore are 
in a better position to know and respond to local concerns.164 This 
greater responsiveness encourages public participation and 
accountability, and more broadly may foster the development of social 
capital that helps make a community greater than the sum of its 
parts.165 Of course, this can be a double-edged sword. Many 
commentators have noted that cooperative federalism can lead to 
constituent confusion, because the federal government sets the policy 
objective but state and local officials are the face of that policy to the 
local community.166 This was, of course, the primary reason that  
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Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 27, 29 (2001) (arguing federalism provides social 
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collective action barriers and to get things done”). 
166. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 155, at 386. Adler notes that blurring lines 
of accountability may be one reason why federal policymakers favor 
cooperative federalism regimes: they allow policymakers to take credit 
for the benefits of an initiative while shifting the cost of unpopular 
enforcement to state officials. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy 
1654 
Montana Sheriff Jay Printz objected to being commandeered to serve 
as the face of federal gun control efforts.167  
Together, these rationales support a bottom-up, cooperative 
federalism approach to achieving regional cooperation for renewable 
energy. The federal government has recognized a broad policy 
objective of pursuing more renewable electricity generation in order to 
reduce carbon emissions, diversify America’s energy mix, and reduce 
its dependence on foreign energy sources.168 But although it has been 
around for three decades, the renewable power sector is still relatively 
young and is just starting to achieve economies of scale that will 
make it a viable alternative to fossil fuel generation. There is no clear 
consensus yet regarding which forms of renewable energy are best, 
how best to bring new generation to market, or what the ideal fuel 
mix is between renewable energy and more traditional energy sources. 
Given that there is so little consensus on these important policy 
questions, the industry is likely to benefit from continued interstate 
competition and experimentation as policymakers find the best way to 
develop more renewable energy.  
Moreover, different regions have different renewable energy stores 
available. Prairie states and offshore Atlantic wind farms are likely to 
pursue wind energy; southwestern states may develop more solar and 
geothermal energy; southern states are more likely to harness biomass; 
and so on. A comprehensive renewable energy plan will thus depend 
on local knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of several local 
geographic areas, which argues in favor of a greater role for state and 
local authorities. 
IV. Overcoming Obstacles to Renewable Energy 
Through Cooperative Federalism 
Thus cooperative federalism provides a mechanism by which state 
and local officials can, and should, play a significant role in helping 
develop the future of renewable energy. Although, as noted above, 
state and local officials can be obstacles to renewable energy 
development, this stems in part from the fact that renewable 
development implicates many state and local issues. This section 
examines specific ways that the federal government can use 
cooperative federalism to increase state and local officials’ sensitivity 
to broader regional goals and to encourage greater regional 
cooperation in pursuit of national objectives.  
 
167. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904–05 (1997). 
168. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 19 Stat. 594 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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A. Siting Renewable Generation Facilities 
Like most land use regulations, the siting of specific renewable 
generation facilities is largely a local issue.169 The questions of 
whether, when, and how a company should be permitted to build a 
wind turbine or photovoltaic solar array in a local community 
depends significantly upon local information regarding the impact of 
the access on the surrounding environment. Local officials will know 
key issues such as the value to the community of scenic vistas that 
may be affected by construction, and the proximity of the proposed 
turbine to local population centers and therefore the extent to which 
its operations would pose a nuisance to the community. Finally, local 
officials would be in the best position to determine what conditions 
may be appropriate to abate any potential nuisances, such as limited 
hours of operation, setbacks, or safety regulations.  
It would be a mistake for the federal government to preempt 
renewable generation siting authority, as it has done with regard to 
liquefied natural gas terminals. This move may bring new generation 
to market faster and provide an easy avenue to overcome local 
opposition, though that is not certain: federal siting authority may be 
subject to federal statutes such as NEPA, which create additional 
veto gates that determined opponents could use to slow the federal 
siting process.170 But even if it could, this expediency comes at the 
expense of local knowledge. Federal regulators would be less capable 
of assessing proposed sites and distinguishing valid from invalid 
objections to assess the true cost that the project will impose on the 
local community. As Kenneth Kristl explains, preemption eliminates 
the political mechanism that keeps local officials attuned to the 
community’s needs: to wit, the political risk of ignoring community 
opposition and being voted out of office.171 
But as noted above, purely local siting decisions run the risk of 
denying projects that are net beneficial to society. A local decision 
maker will weigh the largely local costs of construction to the 
community, but may fail to account for the benefit of renewable 
energy, which is largely regional in scope. Moreover, denial of a 
renewable generation facility may disrupt economies of scale across 
the interstate electricity grid, as it reduces a source of renewable 
 
169. Stein, supra note 132, at 221. 
170. Cf. Holtkamp & Davidson, supra note 90, at 384–85 (noting that state 
and local opposition to federal transmission project approvals can delay 
construction by challenging federal environmental impact statements or 
by litigating the line until the impact statement expires). 
171. Kenneth T. Kristl, Renewable Energy and Preemption: Lessons from 
Siting LNG Terminals, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Winter 2009, at 58, 
60. 
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power and therefore a chance to smooth intermittent renewable 
resources through expansion. 
One can solve this problem by using cooperative federalism to 
constrain the local official’s discretion and require him or her to 
examine the project from a more regional scope. Ostrow recommends 
a “process preemption” approach that leaves primary siting authority 
in local hands but places explicit procedural and sometimes 
substantive limits on the local official’s authority.172 This approach is 
modeled on the provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996173 
governing cell tower siting. Prior to the 1996 Act, communities 
frequently opposed the installation of cell towers, because of aesthetic 
harm and the fear of electromagnetic radiation. The 1996 Act helped 
curtail this behavior by reining in the local siting approval process.174 
The Act places numerous procedural requirements on the local 
authority, including a shot clock requiring a response within a 
reasonable period of time, a requirement that any decision be in 
writing and a federal right of action to appeal a denial in federal court 
if the denial “unreasonably discriminate[s] among providers of 
functionally equivalent services” or “prohibit[s] or has the effect of 
prohibiting the provision of personal wireless service.”175 The Act also 
prohibits local authorities from rejecting cell towers because of the 
fear of electromagnetic radiation, if the tower is within the parameters 
set by the agency. 
Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission has placed 
procedural restrictions on municipal authority to license cable 
systems. The Communications Act of 1934176 prevents a cable 
provider from installing or operating a cable system within a city 
without a license from the local franchising authority (usually a 
subdivision of the municipal government).177 This requirement allows 
 
172. Ostrow, supra note 71, at 290.  
173. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.).  
174. See Ostrow, supra note 71, at 292–93. 
175. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)–(C) (2012). 
176. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (2012) 
177. Some states, such as California and Texas, were wary of the potential 
for municipal abuse of the franchising process and therefore provide an 
alternative for cable companies to receive statewide franchises. The 
Communications Act allows the states the flexibility to determine what 
the local franchising authority should be for a given market. See 
generally Thomas Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises as Barriers to Video 
Competition, 12 Va. J.L. & Tech. 2, 6 (2007) (“Proposed national 
legislation would substantially restrict a local government’s ability to 
regulate competitive cable operators while several state legislatures are 
considering issuing statewide cable franchises to phone carriers.”). 
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local entities to monitor the cable company’s installation of a network 
into the public right-of-way, so as to minimize the disruption that this 
construction would have on municipal operations. But the 
Commission found that local franchising authorities sometimes abused 
the franchise process, by delaying or denying new entrants178 and by 
attaching conditions that had very little to do with providing cable, 
such as requiring AT&T to provide free wireless telephone service to 
city employees or fund construction of a community swimming pool. 
The Commission found that these abuses of the local licensing process 
had national consequences by making it harder for telephone 
companies, which sought to enter the cable market, to build the 
economies of scale necessary to compete against entrenched cable 
incumbents. As a result, the Commission enacted rules limiting the 
local government’s ability to abuse the franchising process, including 
a shot clock for applications, limits on reasons a franchise may be 
rejected, and restraints on the types and amounts of conditions that a 
franchising authority can place on approvals.179  
The federal government can similarly adopt very narrow general 
guidelines that would limit the potential for abuse of the siting 
process and force state and local officials to consider the regional 
benefits of a project. Ostrow recommends a bundle of guidelines that 
read almost as an Administrative Procedures Act for local siting 
authority. These include a “shot clock” that requires the local 
authority to issue a decision within a certain number of days after the 
application is filed. The guidelines would also require that any 
decision be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written 
record and that the decision be subject to judicial review in federal 
court (which is more likely than state courts to be independent of the 
parochial interests that would otherwise jeopardize the project).180 
Together, these guidelines help provide some regularity to the process 
and force the decision maker to justify his or her decision to a neutral 
magistrate. 
In addition to these recommendations, the guidelines might 
require that the decision maker take into consideration the regional 
environmental benefits that would be gained from the project. This 
substantive requirement would effectively force the local decision 
maker into more of a regional role and correct some of the 
 
178. Because the city received a percentage of cable sales as a franchise tax, 
it had incentives to preserve an incumbent monopolist’s market power 
and thus maximize its own tax revenue. 
179. Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984 as amended, 22 FCC Rcd. 5101 (2007). See generally 
Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(upholding Commission rules against challenge to statutory authority). 
180. Ostrow, supra note 71, at 330–35. 
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externalities that would otherwise occur from the fact that renewable 
energy often displays concentrated costs and dispersed benefits. 
Furthermore, the guidelines might prohibit certain grounds for denial, 
such as denying a wind turbine on noise pollution grounds if the 
turbine is within federal noise limits. Like the electromagnetic limits 
in cell tower siting cases, this prevents entities from seizing upon 
spurious excuses to deny an unpopular project or denying the project 
because of unreasonable cost concerns. 
B. Electricity Transmission 
1. Grid Stability 
The dynamics of the transmission market are quite different than 
the market for generation. The transmission grid is the interstate 
highway system of the electricity industry and carries an increasing 
amount of electricity across state lines, especially renewable energy. 
As a result, many of the key regulatory questions regarding 
transmission operations are regional in scope. These questions include: 
What policies will maximize the likelihood that the total amount of 
electricity dispatched to the grid at any given time is sufficient to 
meet aggregate electricity demand? Do we need an independent 
system operator to manage transmission capacity? How should 
wholesale power sales be regulated? How should the costs of new 
transmission lines be allocated among beneficiaries? Regulators’ 
answers to these questions have effects that reach across state lines. 
When policies promote better grid management, the benefits flow to 
customers throughout the region. And when grid management fails, 
the costs are borne by customers across state lines—as they were 
when the 2003 blackout interrupted electrical power for a long period 
of time throughout the Eastern Seaboard. Because the challenges of 
grid management are regional in scope, they are best answered by a 
more significant regional entity. 
Fortunately, the industry has already achieved a significant 
amount of regional cooperation through bottom-up coordination 
structures known as Independent System Operators (ISOs) and 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). When FERC 
mandated that utilities offer their transmission lines on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to independent power generators in 1996, it 
adopted a series of orders encouraging utilities to band together to 
form ISOs and RTOs.181 ISOs and RTOs are separate, nonprofit  
181. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 21,540 (Apr. 21, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385); 
Regional Transmission Organizations, FERC Order 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 
61,285 (1999) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (promoting the 
formation of RTOs). 
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entities charged with managing the transmission system on behalf of 
its member utilities. Utilities participating in these transmission 
organizations retain ownership of their transmission lines, but 
surrender daily operation of those lines to the organization.182 The 
ostensible purpose of this requirement is to prevent utilities from 
using their control of transmission facilities to stifle competition in the 
generation market. But the organization brings the added benefit of 
building economies of scale in the transmission market: because the 
organization controls the flow of electricity over a larger portion of 
the grid, it can smooth out supply or demand variations over a  
larger footprint. 
Today, there are six independent entities under FERC 
jurisdiction, each of which manage a portion of the transmission grid: 
the California ISO, the Midwest ISO, ISO New England, the New 
York ISO, the PJM Interconnection, and the Southwest Power Pool 
RTO.183 ERCOT performs a similar function in Texas, independently 
of FERC oversight.184 Notably, not all areas of the country are 
covered by these entities; many western and southern utilities have 
resisted turning over the management of their transmission systems to 
an independent operator and instead remain governed by tariffs filed 
with the Commission. In western states, however, many of these 
utilities cooperate on a less formal basis through participation in the 
Western Electricity Coordinating Council or the Western Area Power 
Administration.185  
  
 
182. Kaplan, supra note 84, at 7. 
183. Id. at 8. 
184. Id. at 6. 
185. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1848–49. 
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Figure 2186 
 
Although they are non-governmental entities formed by the 
utilities rather than by state or local government officials, these 
regional transmission organizations exhibit many of the benefits of 
cooperative federalism. They are, by definition, bottom-up 
organizations, formed by voluntary agreements between utilities and 
therefore operate in a geographic area no larger or smaller than 
necessary to manage grid stability for its member utilities. Because 
each organization manages the grid on behalf of its members, its 
operations leverage local knowledge about transmission capacity, 
generation capacity, and demand in real-time. This allows each 
organization to balance supply and demand efficiently.  
Moreover, over the past fifteen years ISOs and RTOs have 
worked with federal and state officials to experiment with different 
ways of managing the transition to more deregulated wholesale 
markets. California’s energy crisis was an obvious disaster, but its 
high-profile struggles have overshadowed more successful transitions 
in other regions, such as PJM.187 And even the California experiment  
186. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, http://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/mkt-electric/overview/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf (last visited Sept. 
3, 2014). 
187. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the 
Electricity Market, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 451, 468–79 (2005). 
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yielded valuable lessons for other markets. The decentralized, bottom-
up structure of grid operations has helped regulators and industry 
participants explore many potential market structures within the 
confines of broad federal mandates.  
2. Transmission Line Planning and Siting 
Planning and siting future transmission lines to bring renewable 
energy to market is also best done through a more formal regional 
structure. Decision makers must identify current pockets of congestion 
and forecast both demand growth and areas where renewable capacity 
growth is most likely to occur. With increasing diversification of the 
generation industry generally and the growth of the renewable sector 
specifically, an increasing amount of electricity is, and will be, 
transported between points in different states. Like grid operation, 
planning and siting requires a regional focus on the wholesale 
electricity market that state regulators are often unwilling or unable 
to consider. 
Moreover, the planning process for new transmission capacity and 
the siting of specific transmission lines should work in tandem. As Jim 
Rossi has explained, states, such as Texas, that have focused on 
reforming their transmission siting regimes have had the most success 
in achieving their RPS goals.188 As part of its 2005 revision to its 
renewable portfolio standards requirement, Texas designated five 
areas, mostly in the western part of the state, as “Competitive 
Renewables Energy Zones” (CREZs) with sufficient potential for 
large-scale development of renewable energy. The legislation also 
developed a plan to build new transmission capacity from CREZ areas 
to bring that new energy into the Texas grid.189 The Texas Public 
Utilities Commission engaged in a comprehensive process to assess the 
CREZ areas, plan and site new lines, and determine how the lines’ 
costs will be allocated to consumers. As a result, Texas achieved its 
2025 wind energy target of 10,000 megawatts of renewable energy 
capacity on the Texas grid fifteen years ahead of schedule.190  
Outside of Texas, there are many efforts to engage in regional 
transmission planning. The RTOs have long been a place for member 
utilities to forecast and plan new capacity. And outside the six  
188. Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National 
Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 361, 377 
(2011). 
189. Mark Dreyfus, Texas CREZ Policy and Transmission 
Expansion Update 5 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www. 
austinenergy.com/about%20us/newsroom/Reports/keyAccountsCREZ_
TSAR.pdf. 
190. What are the Texas Renewable Energy Targets?, StateImpact, 
https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/tag/texas-renewable-energy-targets/ 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014).  
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ISO/RTO areas, there has been substantial bottom-up regional 
planning as well, including efforts focused specifically on the need for 
new transmission capacity for renewable energy. Noteworthy in this 
respect is the Western Renewable Energy Zones initiative in 2008, a 
project funded by the Department of Energy but led by the Western 
Governors’ Association to study and plan for future renewable 
transmission capacity.191 In 2011 FERC issued Order 1000,  
which among other initiatives required all utilities to engage in 
regional transmission planning and ultimately produce a regional 
transmission plan.192 
But siting authority remains decoupled from transmission 
planning and located primarily at the state or local level, which 
remains a stumbling block to new transmission construction. As noted 
above, state and local regulators lack incentives to assess the full 
benefits and costs of many transmission lines, particularly interstate 
lines. Congress attempted to solve this problem by granting FERC 
backstop siting authority as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.193 
The Act requires the Department of Energy to undertake a triennial 
study of electric transmission congestion and “designate any 
geographic area experiencing electric energy transmission capacity 
constraints or congestion that adversely affects consumers as a 
national interest electric transmission corridor” (NIETC)194 Once an 
area is designated as an NIETC, the Act gives FERC “backstop” 
siting authority to override state barriers to new transmission 
construction.195 To exercise this authority, FERC must determine 
that: (1) the state does not have authority to approve siting of 
facilities or to consider the interstate benefits of the project; (2) the 
utility does not qualify for state approval because it does not serve 
end-user customers in the state; (3) the state has authority to approve 
the siting but has withheld approval for more than a year; or (4) the 
state has approved the project with such conditions as to not 
significantly reduce interstate transmission congestion or to make the 
project economically infeasible.196 
 
191. See Western Renewable Energy Zones, W. Governors’ Ass’n, 
http://www.westgov.org/rtep/219 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (providing 
an overview of the Western Renewable Energy Zones initiative). 
192. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities, FERC Order 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 
(2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).  
193. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221(b), 119 Stat. 947 (2005) (codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 824p(a)–(b) (2012)). 
194. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(2)  
195. § 824p(b).  
196. Id.  
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But thus far, courts have largely hamstrung the agencies’ efforts 
to exercise this authority. In 2007, the Department of Energy 
designated the first two NIETCs under the Act: one in the southwest 
running from Arizona to California and one in the Mid-Atlantic 
between New York and Washington, DC.197 But the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals invalidated these designations in 2011, in part 
because the agency failed to adequately consult with the affected 
states.198 Meanwhile, FERC promulgated regulations interpreting its 
siting authority broadly, to include instances in which states deny 
siting permits. But the Fourth Circuit invalidated this rule, rejecting 
FERC’s argument that a denial constitutes the “with[olding] [of] 
approval . . . for more than a year.”199 The court explained that the 
agency’s backstop authority extended to delayed or conditional 
approvals but not to explicit denials of siting applications. 
Interestingly, the 2005 Act also authorized three or more states to 
enter an interstate compact to establish a regional siting agency.200 To 
incentivize states to enter such agreements, the Act prohibits FERC 
generally from exercising its backstop authority to permit a line in a 
state that is a part of a compact.201 But perhaps because neither the 
Department of Energy nor FERC has yet exercised its authority 
under the Act in a way that has undermined state siting authority, no 
states have entered into a compact.202 
Going forward, the solution to the transmission dilemma requires 
a more successful integration of transmission planning and siting at 
the regional level. It is difficult for RTOs and other voluntary 
planning organizations to integrate siting into their portfolio, because 
as non-state actors they largely lack eminent domain authority. 
Ideally, this impetus would come from state compacts such as those 
envisioned in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which would effectively 
create bottom-up regional governance structures with the planning 
and siting authority to plan comprehensive future transmission 
projects. But as the Act shows, sates are unlikely to do so without 
some impetus. One solution may be for Congress to grant federal 
 
197. National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992 
(Oct. 5, 2007).  
198. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th 
Cir. 2011). The Court also found that the department failed to satisfy 
certain requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. Id. at 
1096–106.  
199. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 
304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009). 
200. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, § 1221(i), 119 Stat. 950–51 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §824q(i) (2012)).  
201. § 1221(i)(4).  
202. Klass & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1819–20. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy 
1664 
eminent domain to any regional planning organization under Order 
1000, but to exempt from this order any state that voluntarily enters 
into a compact that includes planning and siting. This approach may 
jumpstart state government initiatives to cooperate in the promotion 
of future transmission capacity, because a state’s failure to do so risks 
the specter of federally chartered regional planning organizations 
riding roughshod over local opposition to new transmission capacity. 
C. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
As detailed at length above, state public utility commissions have 
largely driven greater demand for renewable energy, primarily through 
renewable portfolio standards that require utilities to purchase a 
certain percentage of their electricity for distribution from renewable 
sources. The Waxman-Markey Bill raised the question whether the 
federal government should set a national minimum renewable 
portfolio standard. Although the bill did not pass, the idea of a 
federal RPS has been repeatedly introduced in Congress203 and has 
received significant attention from academics and policymakers.204 
Advocates cite several reasons to support a federal renewable 
portfolio standard. Many of these simply mirror arguments made at 
the state level: renewable energy may reduce air pollution and 
greenhouse gas emissions, save on long-term energy costs, and 
increase American energy interdependence.205 These are arguments to 
support renewable energy generally, but do not address the specific 
question of why the federal government is in the best position to do 
so. Addressing the jurisdictional question more directly, Lincoln 
Davies asserts that a national standard would make the renewable 
energy market “more liquid, transparent, and uniform” by setting a 
single nationwide definition for what counts as a renewable 
resource.206 Because the different states have different RPS criteria, 
investors may be apprehensive about making long-term investments 
in renewable generation, and those investments they do make could 
be driven more by state political preferences than the product’s 
“salient economic features.”207 Moreover, a national standard would 
 
203. Davies, supra note 64, at 1364–65. 
204. See, e.g., id. at 1365; Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing 
Market: The Impact of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the 
U.S. Energy Industry, 29 Energy L.J. 49 (2008); Rossi, supra note 188 
(arguing against a national portfolio standard); Mary Ann Ralls, 
Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need to Mandate Renewable 
Portfolio Standards, 27 Energy L.J. 451 (2006) (same). 
205. Davies, supra note 64, at 1370–75. 
206. Id. at 1366. 
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“eliminate jurisdictional problems” of state standards that give 
preferential treatment to in-state resources. 
In response, Jim Rossi notes that the environmental case for 
renewable energy is not as clear as proponents suggest.208 The need to 
rely on inefficiently running fossil-fuel power plants to back up 
intermittent renewable generation detracts from the environmental 
benefits of renewable electricity production.209 And given the decline 
in natural gas prices, investments in renewable energy likely replace 
investments in relatively low-emission natural gas plants, not in 
dirtier coal power plants. Moreover, Rossi notes that because most 
states already have RPS standards, the costs of a federal mandate 
would fall disproportionately on the handful of states that have not 
already done so.210 It seems problematic to adopt a federal mandate 
for which costs fall primarily upon those few whose state-level policy 
choices reflect opposition to that mandate. 
Ultimately, the state’s choice whether to adopt an RPS standard 
is essentially a question whether end-user customers are willing to pay 
an additional cost for (potentially) cleaner energy. That will remain 
true as long as renewable energy remains more expensive than fossil 
fuel energy. The answer to this question depends on precisely how 
much more the consumer must pay for renewable generation—and 
that question varies by state. In states like Texas, where wind and 
solar resources are abundant, the difference between the price of 
renewable energy and conventional energy is relatively small. By 
comparison, a state like West Virginia, which has little renewable 
energy capacity but abundant coal reserves, the price differential is 
much greater. The decision whether to subject consumers to an RPS 
surcharge, therefore, turns on local knowledge about market 
conditions that states, not the federal government, are in the best 
position to assess.  
Moreover, given the relatively immature state of the renewable 
energy generation market, state-level experimentation with different 
renewable sources is likely a net benefit to society. Far from being a 
problem, the lack of uniformity among state RPS qualifications 
represents Justice Brandeis’s “laboratories of democracy” in action.211 
Different state standards are encouraging investors to test a wide 
range of alternatives. Some renewable resources, such as geothermal 
or tidal energy, may be uneconomical on a national scale but may 
prove to be viable in certain areas. A national standard established 
 
208.  Rossi, supra note 188, at 364–66.  
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 366. 
211. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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without the benefit of empirical results at the state level may 
prematurely reject these borderline viable sources of energy. Justice 
Brandeis’s ode to federalism is most famous for its optimistic view of 
the states, but equally important is his opinion’s warning about the 
risks of premature preemption: “[t]o stay experimentation in things 
social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to 
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to  
the Nation.”212  
One may object that state-level RPS standards underinvest in 
renewable technology. Assuming that there are environmental benefits 
to switching to renewable energy, these positive externalities are 
enjoyed nationwide—which may lead some states to free-ride on the 
investments of others. But if the federal government decides that 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is in the national interest, it has 
other means of doing so. 
For example, the federal government may choose to adopt a 
carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program similar to that proposed in 
Waxman-Markey. These initiatives would directly reduce greenhouse 
gases. They may also indirectly stimulate greater renewable energy 
production, because they would raise the price of fossil fuel-generated 
electricity and therefore make renewable electricity relatively  
less expensive. 
Alternatively, the federal government could provide for greater 
funding for renewable energy research and subsidies for new 
construction of renewable energy. From PURPA forward, Congress 
has funded basic research into the feasibility of renewable technologies 
and provided tax credits and other subsidies for new renewable 
generation facilities. In 1992 Congress established a renewable energy 
production tax credit, which gave companies tax credits for each 
kilowatt hour for electricity produced by wind power.213 The same act 
created the Renewable Energy Production Initiative, which gives 
federal incentive payments for electricity generated and sold in the 
wholesale market by new qualifying renewable energy sources.214  
212. Id. at 311. 
213. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Although the original Production Tax Credit 
expired in July 1999, Congress reauthorized the credit numerous times, 
including in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. See Job Creation and 
Worker Assistance Act, Pub. L. 107-147, § 603, 116 Stat. 21, 59 (2002) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)); American Jobs Creation Act, Pub. 
L. 108-357, § 710, 118 Stat. 1418, 1552 (2004) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §45 
(2012)); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, § 202, 119 Stat. 594, 
651 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2012)). The fiscal cliff deal at the 
end of 2012 extended the production tax credit through the end of 2013. 
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, § 407, 126 Stat. 
2313, 2340 (2013) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)).  
214. Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2012). The REPI is 
currently scheduled to sunset in October 2016. § 13317(c) (2012).  
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Congress has also regularly funded research into various renewable 
energy technologies, including setting aside $1.64 billion toward 
research and development of renewable energy technologies as part of 
the 2009 stimulus bill.215 
As David Spence has noted, “[m]any analysts ascribe [much] of 
the credit for the growth in renewables to federal tax incentives.”216 
They help incentivize initial investment in renewable technologies. 
Given the significant fixed cost and relatively small marginal cost of 
most renewable energy production, these initial investment decisions 
go far toward making renewable energy a more cost-efficient 
alternative to traditional energy generation. And credits for renewable 
energy production help reduce the per-megawatt hour price of 
wholesale electricity—occasionally to the point that wind generators 
actually paid utilities to take wind electricity, so as to receive the 
production tax credit.217 Many have shown that the boom-and-bust 
cycle of federal production incentives has had a significant impact on 
overall investment in renewable facilities.218 
Conclusion 
State and local officials have played a significant role throughout 
the electricity industry’s history. The deregulation of electricity 
generation, and the rise of renewable energy as an alternative to 
traditional fossil fuels, has increased the complexity of the industry. 
Going forward, a substantial portion of electricity sales are likely to 
be interstate, particularly given the need to move renewable energy 
from resource-rich middle America to electricity-hungry load centers 
on the coasts. For the renewable power sector, states have played a 
schizophrenic role as both accelerator and brake on industry growth, 
boosting demand for renewable energy while at the same time 
blocking the infrastructure that would bring it to market.  
Federal preemption is a tempting solution to the obstacles posed 
by state and local officials. But succumbing to this temptation would 
sacrifice the valid interests that these officials maintain in renewable 
energy policy decisions, and fails to acknowledge the risks of vesting 
decision-making authority at too high a level.  
215. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 116 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
216. Spence, supra note 9, at 283. 
217. See Ctr. for Energy Econ., Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Lessons 
Learned from Renewable Energy Credit (REC) Trading in 
Texas 20 (2009), http:// www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/ 
transmission_forum/CEE_Texas_RPS_Study.pdf (noting that wind 
generators, which needed wind power to be dispatched to collect 
production tax credits, submitted negative bids in certain hours). 
218. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 9, at 283. 
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Ultimately, the challenges posed by renewable energy are regional 
in scope and require decision makers with a regional focus to respond. 
A bottom-up regional approach to policy questions, vesting authority 
in state and local actors guided toward regional coordination by 
federal prodding, is preferable to a top-down regional approach 
dominated by federal decision makers. Ultimately, a state-centered 
approach helps preserve the diversity that is a hallmark of our 
Federalism. In a market as diverse, young, and dynamic as renewable 
energy, these federalism values can help develop innovative new 
solutions to policy problems and discover the optimal regulatory 
scheme, or schemes, to realize renewable energy’s full potential. 
